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CHALLENGES IN MEETING THE DISABILITY
QUALIFICATION UNDER THE ADA: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S
ANALYSIS IN MASON V. AVAYA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 1 was enacted
in part because of pervasive discrimination against persons with disabili-
ties in this country,a resulting in segregation, 3 inferior status, 4 and a de-
nied opportunity to "compete on an equal basis" with those not disabled.5
A report conducted by the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment
of Americans with Disabilities concluded that this discrimination costs
governments and businesses billions of dollars in "unnecessary expendi-
tures resulting from the dependency and non-productivity of persons
with disabilities.",6 Since the ADA was enacted, there has been signifi-
cant litigation over what constitutes a disability and what accommoda-
tions must be made for those with disabilities.7 In January 2004, the
Tenth Circuit added to this debate when it held for the first time in Ma-
son v. Avaya Communications, Inc.8 that working from home is not a
reasonable accommodation. 9 This ruling is not notable in itself, as a ma-
jority of circuits have reached the same conclusion. What makes this
case unique is the manner in which the Tenth Circuit applied the law to
the peculiar facts and circumstances of Mason's disability. Avaya dem-
onstrates that the ADA provides employers great deference in determin-
ing what constitutes an "essential function" of a job. This deference al-
lows employers to make sweeping assertions to support their view of
what constitutes an essential function of the job without the court apply-
ing much scrutiny. As time progresses beyond the enactment of the
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
2. ADA: PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES § 1.03 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter ADA PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS] (citing NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE-AN ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES WITH LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (1986) [hereinafter NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED], available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/l1986/toward.htm (last
visited Mar. 30, 2005)).
3. ADA PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Id. Inferior status includes "social interactions, economic well-being, vocational pursuits,
and educational attainment." Id
5. Id.
6. Id. Unnecessary expenditures result in part from "provisions of existing Social Security
laws . .. [that] serve to discourage and penalize people with disabilities if they seek to become
employed and selfsupporting." NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 2, at viii-ix. At
the time of the report, annual federal disability programs and benefits cost $60 billion dollars. Id. at
viii.
7. See Ann Hubbard, Meaningful Lives and Major Life Activities, 55 ALA. L. REV. 997
(2004) (citations omitted).
8. 357 F.3d 1114 (2004).
9. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1123.
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ADA, are the disabled more able to compete on an equal basis in the
workplace or has litigation only added more roadblocks on the path to
equality?
The purpose of this article is to explore the ADA and advocate that
decisions like Avaya are not positive steps in the direction of realizing
the policy that drove the enactment of the ADA. Section H is the back-
drop to the discussion. Subsection A discusses the ADA and what Con-
gress hoped to achieve when it enacted the Act. Subsection B discusses
the confusion about the ADA and how it differs from more traditional
civil rights legislation such as affirmative action. Section III discusses
the Avaya case in detail. Section IV is an analysis of the Avaya decision.
Specifically, subsection A discusses the court's ruling that physical at-
tendance in the workplace is an essential job function. Subsection B
discusses inconsistent scrutiny applied to Avaya's and Mason's argu-
ments, and the court's zealous affirmation of Avaya's factual allegations
while derisively crushing Mason's attempts to advocate her position.
Subsection C discusses future directions and advocates that the Tenth
Circuit, and other circuits, should consider taking a more permissive ap-
proach to the merits of valid ADA claims. Section V concludes the dis-
cussion with the argument that the Avaya holding is consistent with the
majority of circuits, but it is not positive step in realizing the legislative
intent behind the ADA.
H. BACKGROUND
The ADA is an anti-discrimination statute like Title VII, but it does
not offer a class-based remedy like its antecedents. Instead, it relies on a
case-specific analysis to determine whether an employer can make a rea-
sonable accommodation for a disabled employee that will not create an
undue burden on the employer.
A. Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA is a "comprehensive federal antidiscrimination statute"'10
enacted in 1990 to combat widespread discrimination against the dis-
abled 1 in this country.12 The ADA, like its federal antidiscrimination
10. Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1996).
11. Under ADA regulations, "disability" as applied to an individual is defined as: "(1) A
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; (2) A record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(g) (2004). Exceptions to this definition are found in 29 C.F.R. §
1630.3 (2004), which includes those engaged in the illegal use of drugs, transvestites, kleptomania,
compulsive gambling, psychoactive substance use disorders, and others. Under 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(m) (2004), a "[q]ualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability
who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the
employment position such individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions of such position." This definition is also subject to the
exceptions listed in § 1630.3 (2004).
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antecedents, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, requires employers to ignore
disabilities in the same way that they must ignore sex, race, religion, or
age. 13 This requirement, referred to as the "sameness model of equality,"
means that it is based on a traditional model of equality where the pro-
tected class (the disabled) must be treated exactly the same as other em-
ployees. 14 Under the sameness model, intentional discrimination and the
"application of neutral rules that adversely affect the protected class"' 5
are prohibited. Unlike its antecedents, however, the ADA also requires
employers to provide "reasonable accommodations to disabled employ-
ees who request them."' 6 Commentators call this the "difference model
of equality" and it stems from the realization that the sameness model of
equality "is not enough to guarantee equality to all individuals with dis-
abilities because sometimes those disabilities . . .can negatively affect
job performance unless they are accommodated."' 7  Upon request, an
employer must consider a disability when accommodating the employee
and treat the disabled employee differently. 18 The sameness and differ-
ence models can be distinguished in that blacks, women, and older work-
ers can complain about discrimination under the sameness model, but
only the disabled can "insist upon discrimination in their favor" under
the difference model. 19
The distinction between the two models can be best explained
through a hypothetical.20 Suppose that a blind employee with a guide
dog works for Company A. Under the sameness model, Company A
cannot discriminate against the employee for raises or promotions on the
grounds that the employee is blind. Likewise, under the sameness
model, Company A cannot require the blind employee to adhere to a
neutral policy, such as "no dogs allowed at the workplace," when that
policy would discriminate against the blind employee. Under the differ-
ence model, if the blind employee requests that Company A reasonably
accommodate for her need to care for her dog during working hours,
assuming she is qualified under the ADA, the company must allow her to
do this if it would not create an undue hardship on them.
As this example shows, what constitutes a reasonable accommoda-
tion depends on the specific circumstances of the employee, the em-
12. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 2, at 20.
13. Id. at 27.
14. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 952, 954 (2004); Karlan & Rutherglen,
supra note 10, at 10.
15. Ball, supra note 14, at 957.
16. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 3.
17. Ball, supra note 14, at 955.
18. Id.
19. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 3.
20. This is an expansion of a similar analogy by Karlan & Rutherglen. See id. at 10.
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ployer, and the working environment. While a blind employee with
guide dog might need an accommodation so that she could care for her
dog during the day, an employee in a wheelchair might need a ramp to
enter the work building. Unlike traditional antidiscrimination statutes,
such as Title VII, that apply to classes of individuals, 2' under the ADA,
each employee with a unique disability requires a unique reasonable ac-
commodation from the employer.22  What constitutes a reasonable ac-
commodation under the ADA is unique to the circumstances because "to
get beyond [an individual's disability], we must first take account of [that
disability]. 2 3 Thus, ADA cases are analyzed on a case-by-case basis.24
Similarly, the facts of each case determine which accommodations
constitute an undue hardship, creating burdens for both the disabled em-
ployee and the employer. 25 The disabled employee bears the burden to
show that reasonable accommodation is possible because the employee
would have a better understanding than the employer of what would be
needed.26 When this accommodation is identified, the burden shifts to
the employer who must show that the accommodation would result in an
undue hardship because the employer has a better understanding of what
meeting this accommodation would cost.
27
When analyzing the facts in an ADA dispute, there are four material
factors that must be considered: (1) the specific disability; (2) the essen-
tial job functions for the disabled employee; (3) the possible
accommodations the employer could make; and, (4) the burden of those
accommodations on the employer.28 Essential job functions and burden
of accommodations are the commonly contested issues because the other
two options are effectively static.2 9  Essential job functions can be
restructured to account for the disability, and thus the critical issue is
whether "job restructuring causes undue hardship to the employer.,
30
B. Affirmative Action and Reasonable Accommodation
Reasonable accommodation under the ADA is often confused with
its Title VII brethren such as affirmative action.31 While the two share
21. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 2; Ball, supra note 14, at 974.
22. See Ball, supra note 14, at 974.
23. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 10 (quoting Justice Blackmun in Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dictum)).
24. See, e.g., Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124 ("The Supreme Court has generally eschewed per se
rules under the ADA ... [and this case] must likewise be made on a case-by-case basis.") (citing
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999)).
25. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 12.
26. Id. at 12-13.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 13.
29. See id. For example, if an employee were blind, this would not generally be a fact in
dispute. Likewise, the job responsibilities, work space, and other relevant factors would determine
the accommodations an employer could make to enable the employee to function effectively.
30. Id. at 14.
31. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 14, at 960.
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similarities, they are also vastly different.32  Indeed, affirmative action
and reasonable accommodation are terms that have been used inter-
changeably by the judiciary, prompting some commentators to distin-
guish between the two.33 While they are similar in that both provide
special treatment to classes of individuals, 34 there are several key distinc-
tions. While affirmative action is a form of remedy for past wrongs,
reasonable accommodation applies to current or future discrimination as
a form of compensation for a handicap35 that enables the disabled to
compete and perform equally with their nondisabled colleagues and it
ensures that they will remain on equal footing in the future. 36 Affirma-
tive action applies to a class of individuals, regardless of their circum-
stances, while reasonable accommodation is a "highly individualized
form of analysis that looks to the particular interaction ... between an
employee's disability and the essential functions of a job. 37 Affirmative
action only requires a person to be a member of a protected class for eli-
gibility, while reasonable accommodation requires the employee to show
membership in a class (disabled) and that "the employer's policies con-
stitute particular barriers ... that interfere with the ability of that particu-
lar employee to perform the essential functions of the job. 38 In other
words, class membership is necessary, but not sufficient, to meet the
eligibility requirement under reasonable accommodation; thus, member-
ship in the disabled class does not, by itself, constitute grounds for pref-
erential treatment under ADA.39
III. MASON V. AVAYA COMMUNICATIONS, INC.4 0
A. Facts
Diane Mason worked for the United States Post Office in Edmund,
Oklahoma.41 After witnessing the murder of several of her co-employees
at the post office in 1986,42 she sought counseling and was diagnosed
with post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").4 3 She changed jobs in
32. Id.
33. See id. at 973; Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 14.
34. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 14.
35. Professor Ball uses the term "substantive liability" to characterize an employer's forward-
looking obligation to compensate for a handicap. See Ball, supra note 14, at 953, 969, 973, 977.
36. Id. at 960, 973. See also Hubbard, supra note 7, at 1039 ("the ADA was the promise of
'the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free
society is justifiably famous."') (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101)).
37. Ball, supra note 14, at 974.
38. Id. at 975.
39. Id.
40. Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (2004).
41. Avaya, 357F.3dat 1116.
42. Id. at 1116-17. The incident on August 20, 1986 was coined the "Edmund Post Office
massacre." Id. See, e.g., Leonard Saffir, 'Terrified For My Life' Says Post Office Massacre Survi-
vor, LAKE WORTH HERALD, Mar. 28, 2002 (eyewitness account of the massacre and her subsequent
challenges with PTSD), available at http:f/www.postalwatch.org/2002 01_17_lakeworth-postal
_police.htm#Terrified (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
43. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1117.
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1998 because working for the post office aggravated her disorder.44
Avaya hired her as a service coordinator, a position where she scheduled
service appointments for field technicians, monitored the service ticket
queue, and communicated with technicians by "computer, telephone, and
fax.' '4 From January 1998 to March 2000, her work performance was
satisfactory and without incident.46 On March 21, 2000, her co-
employee, Kevin Lunsford, pulled a knife on another employee during a
verbal confrontation and was given a one-week suspension.47 Mason did
not witness the altercation, but she heard about it from other employ-
ees.48 She was also told "that Lunsford had previously threatened to 'go
postal,' retained a cache of weapons, and compiled a 'hit list.'"49 Avaya
informed employees that it had conducted a "fitness-for-duty examina-
tion on Lunsford and concluded that he could safely return to the work-
force.,' 50 When Lunsford returned to work on March 28, 2000, "Mason
called in sick because she was physically and emotionally unable to work
with Lunsford ..... 51 Doctors confirmed that she suffered a relapse of
PTSD.52 Mason told Avaya that she could come back to work, but not in
the same building as Lunsford while he was working.53 Avaya placed
her on short-term disability,
54 which lasted a year. 55
In June 2000, "Mason requested Avaya accommodate her disorder
by (1) relocating Lunsford, (2) allowing Mason to work at another Avaya
facility in Oklahoma City, or (3) allowing her to work out of her
home." 56 After review, Avaya concluded that it could not relocate
Lunsford, it could not allow Mason to work out of her home because
"physical attendance at the administration center was a function of a ser-
vice coordinator's job," and it recommended that Mason inquire about
other service coordinator positions through its transfer program.57 Ma-
son looked into the transfer program; the only available service coordina-
tor positions in Oklahoma City were in the facility where she worked,
and she did not want to move from Oklahoma.58 After a year on short-
term disability, Avaya denied Mason's request for long-term disability












55. Id. at 1118.
56. Id. at lll7.
57. Id. at 1117-18.
58. Id. at 1118.
59. Id.
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B. Background
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual on
the basis of a disability.60  Discrimination is defined as "'not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . em-
ployee[. ' ' 61 To be a qualified individual, the employee must make a
prima facie case for discrimination by showing: (1) the employee was
"disabled within the meaning of the ADA"; (2) the employee is "quali-
fied, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential
functions of the job held or desired"; and, (3) the employee was dis-
criminated against because of the disability.62 A disability means that an
individual has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual .... a record of
such an impairment .... or being regarded as having such an impair-
ment.
, 63
The employee "bears the burden of showing she is able to perform
the essential functions of her job." Evidence of whether a job function
is essential includes, but is not limited to:
65
(i) the employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii)
written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job; (iii) the amount of time spent on the job per-
forming the function; (iv) the consequences of not requiring the in-
cumbent to perform the function; and ... (vi) the work experience of
past incumbents in the job .... 66
Consideration is given to the employer's judgment regarding which
job functions are essential 67 and the court will not second guess this
judgment when its description is '.ob-related, uniformly enforced, and
consistent with business necessity ' ' 8 or requires "the employer to lower
company standards."
69
Mason filed a discrimination claim against Avaya with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which determined
that there was "reasonable cause to believe Avaya violated the ADA.,
70
Mason brought an action under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, in
60. Id. at 1118 (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2004)).
61. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1118 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
62. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), which defines a "qualified individual with a disability").
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2004).
64. Avaya, 357 F.3d at I 119.
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004).
66. Id. The Avaya court considered several of these factors in its analysis. Avaya, 357 F.3d at
1120.
67. Id. at 1119 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
68. Id. (citing Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003)).
69. Id. (citing Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989, 993 (10th Cir. 2001)).
70. Id. at 1118.
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the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against Avaya,
alleging that Avaya violated the ADA by failing to "accommodate her
post traumatic stress disorder by ... refusing to allow her to work from
home" and terminating her.7 ' The District Court granted Avaya's motion
for summary judgment because Mason failed to prove she was a quali-
fied individual with a disability under the ADA.72 Mason followed with
a direct appeal to the Tenth Circuit.
73
C. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis
Since Avaya conceded that Mason was disabled, Mason met the
first element of an ADA prima facie case.74 The dispute focused on the
second element, whether Mason was "qualified, with or without reason-
able accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or
desired., 75 To show qualification, Mason must meet at least one prong
of a two-prong analysis: (1) whether a disabled person "can perform the
essential functions of the job," and if not, (2) whether the employer can
make any reasonable accommodations to enable the employee to perform
the essential functions of the job.76 Mason could only pursue the second
prong of this test because she could not perform the essential functions of
her job while working with Lunsford; his presence was the trigger of her
disability. Accordingly, Mason argued she could perform the essential
functions of the coordinator position, but she required a reasonable ac-
commodation because her disability prevented her from working with
Lunsford.77
Due to her unique disability, how it is triggered, and the circum-
stances of her work situation, Mason had only one viable legal argument
to meet her burden: she had to convince the court that working from
home was a reasonable accommodation. First, Avaya would not fire
Lunsford 78 and they were not legally required to transfer him under the
ADA.79 Second, she did not want to move from Oklahoma City,80 Avaya
did not have any open coordinator positions in other service centers in
the city, and they were not legally required to open a new position for her
71. Id. at 1116.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1118.
75. Id.
76. Id. (citing Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1190; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)).
77. Id. at 1119.
78. Id. at 1117.
79. Id. at 1119 (citing Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995), which
stated that an accommodation that adversely affects other employees is not required under the
ADA).
80. Id. The district court held this to be "unreasonable," yet the Supreme rule statement does
not address this issue.
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under the ADA.8 It is implied that there was no flexibility in shifting
her work times such that she could work in the same facility, but not at
the same time, as Lunsford 82  Thus, Mason only had one other option
available to her: convince the court that working from home was a rea-
sonable accommodation that would enable her to perform the essential
functions of the service coordinator position.
83
The Tenth Circuit rejected Mason's argument that physical atten-
dance at the Avaya service center was not an "essential function of the
service coordinator position because she can perform all of the essential
functions of the job at home using a computer, telephone, and fax ma-
chine."84 Instead, the Tenth Circuit determined for the first time that
physical attendance is an essential function of a job when it ruled that
Mason's presence at Avaya's work center is an essential function of the
service coordinator position because the position requires supervision
and teamwork.
85
In making this determination, the court first relied on the ADA's re-
quirement that the court consider Avaya's judgment of what the essential
functions of the coordinator position entailed. 86 Avaya asserted that Ma-
son's physical presence at the service center was an essential function of
her job because the "low-level hourly position is administrative in nature
and requires supervision." 87 If Mason worked from home, Avaya alleged
that it would know that she was logged into her computer, but it could
88not ascertain her computer activities. Likewise, the court ruled that
Avaya supplied "significant evidence demonstrating that teamwork was
an essential function of the service coordinator position" when it noted
that coordinators "typically assist and cover for one another in a job.
' 89
To support their arguments, Avaya presented evidence to the district
81. Id. (citing Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1995), which
held that a reassignment to a vacant position is a possible acceptable accommodation, but it is not
reasonable to require the company to create a new position).
82. Id. This is implied by the lack of discussion on the topic of flex time or changing shifts
(e.g., move from day shift to night shift) as a means for Mason to avoid working with Lunsford.
83. Id. While the court stated that it had to conduct the two-prong qualification analysis, it
was really only determining whether Mason's request to work from home was a reasonable accom-
modation because she could not work at the service center and her other options had already been
whittled away through interim analysis. Further, as both prongs require "essential function" of a
position as a necessary condition, their analysis hung on what they determined was an essential
function. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, "consideration shall be given to the employer's
judgment." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2004). Since the court conceded this issue with high deference to
Avaya through a minimal showing, the court effectively rubber-stamped Avaya's determination. See
id. at 1119 ("We will not second guess the employer's judgment ... [or] require the employer to
lower company standards." (citations omitted)).
84. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
85. See id. at 1119,1122.
86. Id. at 1119.
87. Id. at 1120.
88. Id. at 1120-21.
89. Id. at 1121.
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court of four of the seven evidentiary factors identified by the EEOC in
its regulations. 90 Specifically:
(1) .. .attendance at the administration center, supervision, and
teamwork as essential functions of the service coordinator position,
(2) all of its service coordinators work their entire shift at the admini-
stration centers, (3) it has never permitted a service coordinator to
work anywhere other than an administration center, and (4) service
coordinators cannot be adequately trained or supervised if they are
not at the administration center.
91
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly held that "Mason's
physical attendance at the administrative center was an essential function
of the service coordinator position because [it] required supervision and
teamwork.,
92
Mason did not persuade the court that the essential functions of the
coordinator position do not include supervision and teamwork.93 Mason
relied on firsthand experience and she noted that the job description does
not mention supervision or teamwork as a duty or position responsibil-
ity.94 The court dismissed her firsthand experience as "self-serving tes-
timony '"95 and rejected her allegations that any of the fourteen coordina-
tors can cover for one another, or that she could cover for any of them as
long as she had a telephone, computer, and fax machine at home.
96
The court pointed to a Seventh Circuit holding that "[t]he mere fact
that others could do [Mason's] work does not show that the work is non-
essential ' 97 and it placed little credence to Mason's "bald assertion" that
technology would enable her to cover her employees98 because it was "in
no position to second guess Avaya's desire to directly supervise its lower
level employees."
99
The court determined that an at-home accommodation, under the
facts in this case, was facially unreasonable because it would "eliminate
90. Id. at 1120 (referring to 29 C.FR. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004)), Under section 1630.2(n)(3)
(2004) code section, the seven evidentiary factors used to determine whether a job function is essen-
tial include, but are not limited to:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions pre-
pared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the
job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past
incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
91. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
92. Id. at 1122.
93. Id. at 1121-22.
94. Id. at 1120.
95. Id. at 1121-22.
96. Id. at 1121.
97. Id. (citing Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2001)).
98. d. at 1121 n.2.
99. Id. at 1121.
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or change the essential functions of the service coordinator position."' 00
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited cases in other circuits that
held that an "employee's request for an at-home accommodation is un-
reasonable under the ADA." 10 Here, as noted, the court held that be-
cause the coordinator position required supervision and teamwork, work-
ing in the Avaya service center was an essential function of the job, and
thus an employee cannot "effectively perform all work-related duties at
home."'' 02 As a result, "Mason's request for an at-home accommodation
is, as a matter of law, unreasonable."'' 0 3 The court concluded that Mason
was not a "qualified individual with a disability under the ADA because
she could not perform the essential function of the service coordinator
position with or without a reasonable accommodation ... [and thus she]
failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under
the ADA."' 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted, and dismissed, a con-
flicting opinion in the Ninth Circuit'0 5 in Humphrey v. Memorial Hospi-
tals. Association,10 6 which held that "[w]orking at home is a reasonable
accommodation when the essential functions of the position can be per-
formed at home and a work-at-home arrangement would not cause undue
hardship for the employer."'0 7 The court distinguished Humphrey as a
case involving "unusual" or "extraordinary" facts because the plaintiff,
Humphrey, was a medical transcriptionist whose employer permitted
some of its other transcriptionists to work from home.'0 8 The Fourth
Circuit asserted a similar point in Tyndall v. National Education Cen-
ters10 9 that it is an unusual case "where an employee can effectively per-
form all work-related duties at-home."' 10 The permissive attitude on the
part of Humphrey's employer differed vastly from that of Avaya in this
case.
100. Id. at 1124.
101. id. at 1123 (citing Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544-45 (7th Cir.
1995); Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 51, 57-58 (lst Cir. 2001); Hypes v. First Commerce Corp.,
134 F.3d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (quot-
ing Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544)).
102. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124 (citing Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir.
1994) (this is a synopsis of the Avaya court's reasoning) (italics in original)).
103. Jd. at 1124.
104. Jd. at 1125.
105. id. at 1123-24.
106. Humphrey v. Mem'I Hosps. Assoc., 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136. The Ninth Circuit compared Vande Zande's restrictive rule
(an employer is not required to allow disabled workers to work at home except in extraordinary
circumstances) with the very permissive rule in Langon v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 959
F.2d 1053, 1060-61 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("an employer must consider requested accommodation of
working at home"), and chose instead to "follow the approach taken by the EEOC in its Enforcement
Guidance." Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1137 n.15.
108. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1123-24.
109. 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994).
110. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 214) (italics in original).
550 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:3
IV. ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit did not conduct a fact-specific analysis to deter-
mine that physical attendance is an essential job function. Instead, it
adopted this ruling from cases in other circuits whose facts materially
differed from the facts in this case. 1' Ironically, it dismissed a ruling
from the Ninth Circuit that would have supported a fact-based analysis
on grounds that the facts in that case were distinguishable. To add insult,
the court applied inconsistent scrutiny to evidence supplied by the liti-
gants in Avaya's favor and summarily dismissed Mason's only opportu-
nity for legal redress.
A. Physical Attendance in the Workplace as an Essential Job Function
The Tenth Circuit held that physical attendance in the workplace is
an essential function of most jobs. 212 To support this holding, the court
cites cases in several circuits that came to the same conclusion, 1 3 and
placed particular emphasis on Tyndall,"t4 Gantt, t5 and Hypes."16  The
court's reliance on these prominently cited cases is misplaced, however,
because ADA cases require a fact-specific analysis and the facts in
Avaya can be distinguished from these cases.
111. See infra notes 113-15.
112. Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (2004).
113. See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1124. This is the rule in most circuits. See Gantt v. Wilson Sport-
ing Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209 at
213; Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995); Hypes v. First Com-
merce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87
F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Carr v. Reno, 306 U.S. App. D.C. 217, 23 F.3d 525, 530
(D.C. Cir. 1994)); Law v. United States Postal Serv., 852 F.2d 1278, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303, 309-10 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1992);
Santiago v. Temple Univ., 739 F. Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 928 F.2d 396 (3d Cir.
1991)).
114. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 209. In Tyndall, the plaintiff, Mary Tyndall, suffered from lupus
erythematosus, an auto-immune disorder. Id. at 211. Due to her disorder and other issues in her life,
Tyndall began missing work frequently. Id. For example, in a six-month stretch, she missed nine-
teen days on account of helping a friend with a legal matter, her son's surgery, and her disorder. Id.
When she requested a leave of absence to help her son with his post-operative problems, she was
encouraged to resign her teaching position because the school administration was concerned that her
disability and the other issues in her life would disrupt the operations of the school. Id. at 211-12.
115. Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1042. In Gantt, the plaintiff, Una Gantt, hurt her shoulder while work-
ing at her job. Id. at 1044. After several months without improvement, her doctor told her she
required rotator cuff surgery. Id. She informed her employer that she would be out of work between
six to twelve months. Id. After a little over a year on leave, she informed her employer that her
doctor had not released her for work. Id. She was terminated because her employer's absence
policy permitted a maximum of one year leave of absence. Id. at 1045. Two weeks after she was
terminated, her doctor released her to go back to work with some restrictions. Id. at 1045. Gantt did
not request a reasonable accommodation from her employer before or after her doctor released her.
Id. at 1046-47.
116. Hypes, 134 F.3d at 721. In Hypes, the plaintiff, David Hypes, suffered from chronic
obstructive lung disease, which he alleged made it difficult to get "started in the morning." Id. at
724-25. Hypes was chronically late and absent from work and he failed to supply medical docu-
mentation explaining why he was tardy and absent. Id. at 725. Hypes' job required him to conduct
his work in his employer's office because he handled confidential loan documents. Id. at 726. Thus,
working from home was not a feasible option. See id.
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First, the court, quoting Tyndall, stated that '.'the employee 'must be
willing to demonstrate [that she can satisfactorily perform the essential
functions of her position] ... by coming to work on a regular basis."'1
7
Despite the Avaya court's acknowledgement that it reviewed the district
court's grant of summary judgment de novo, it is evident that Mason did
not have a problem attending work regularly because she had the job for
two years before Lunsford's actions, her job performance was satisfac-
tory, and there was no mention that she had an attendance problem prior
to the triggering of her disability. This is a very different situation from
Tyndall who was frequently tardy or absent from work on account of her
disability, her son's surgery, and because she helped a friend with a legal
matter.1 8 The Tyndall rule does not apply to the facts prior to the trig-
gering of Mason's disability, and thus is not the best authority in light of
the facts.
Second, the circuit court's reliance on Gantt is misplaced for similar
reasons.' 9 In Gantt, the appellee did not request telecommuting as a
reasonable accommodation; rather, she was off work for one year with
her disability, she failed to request any accommodation under the ADA,
and she was fired because the company could not foresee when she
would return. 20 Avaya and Gantt are vastly different regarding the mate-
rial facts as to what is requested. Much like its reliance on the Tyndall
holding, the Tenth Circuit blindly relies on the Gantt holding without
consideration for the underlying facts in the case.
Third, the court's application of Hypes is misguided. 21 Hypes can
be distinguished from this case in two ways: Hypes' job responsibilities
required him to be physically present at the office because he handled
confidential loan documents that could not be removed from the office,
and he was chronically late or absent from work despite the requirement
that he be physically present.
22
Here, Mason did not handle confidential documents or other tasks
that objectively need to be handled in the office. Rather, she fielded
phone calls from customers, scheduled appointments, logged repair tick-
ets, monitored the repair queue, and communicated with technicians by
"computer, telephone, and fax."'123 These tasks do not appear to be fa-
cially confidential, and neither the case facts nor analysis mentioned that
Mason's tasks, the information she accessed, or the documents she proc-
essed, were confidential in nature. In contrast, Hypes was required to be
physically present in the office because he had to process documents that
117. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119-20 (citing Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213).
118. See supra note 114.
119. Avaya, 357F.3dat 1119.
120. Gantt, 143 F.3d at 1047.
121. Avaya, 357F.3dat ll19.
122. See Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726.
123. SeeAvaya, 357F.3dat 1117.
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were confidential and thus could not be taken out of the office. 124 There
is no similar constraint in Mason's case. Instead, the Avaya court relied
on more subjectively drawn conclusions that the coordinators required
teamwork and supervision.
25
Hypes' circumstances can also be distinguished because he was
chronically late or absent from work due to his disability, 126 but Mason
was capable of working without incident as long as Lunsford was not in
the building. 27 While Hypes could have conceivably woke up earlier to
arrive at work on time, Mason had no choice regarding working at the
Avaya service center. Her only viable options were (1) move to another
city if she wanted to continue working for Avaya, (2) quit her job, or (3)
work from home.
The application of this rule and the cited case authority imply that
similarity of facts between the instant case and cases in other circuits was
not dispositive to the Tenth Circuit. Instead, the court was swayed by
Avaya's allegation that the position required teamwork and supervi-
sion-goals that could only be met on-site at Avaya's facility-and thus
that physical attendance is an essential function of the job. Therefore,
even when there is no dispute that the employee is disabled, the second
prong of a prima facie showing of discrimination under the ADA, that
the employee be qualified to perform the essential functions of the job,
can be easily trumped by any employer if they make the argument that
physical attendance is an essential function of the job. The court did not
need to invoke such a rigid anti-ADA plaintiff approach; merely ruling
that working from home could be a reasonable accommodation does not
bind the court to making this determination as a conclusion of law. The
Avaya court, however, made its objectivity clear when it stated, "[w]e
will not second guess the employer's judgment when its description is




The Tenth Circuit applied inconsistent scrutiny to allegations made
by Mason and Avaya, to Mason's detriment. Specifically, the court
gives deference to Avaya regarding evidence supplied to the district
court in accordance with EEOC regulations.
124. See Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726.
125. See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
126. See Hypes, 134 F.3d at 725.
127. See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1117 ("From January 1998 until March 2000, Mason worked for
Avaya without incident. Her performance was satisfactory .... [Mason] could not work in the same
building as Lunsford; however, Mason felt she could return to work in Lunsford's absence.").
128. Id. at 1119 (citing Davidson, 337 F.3d at 1191).
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The EEOC has set forth seven types of evidence that can demon-
strate how a job function may be considered "essential.' 29 Avaya pre-
sented four pieces of evidence in conformity with § 1630.2(n), while
Mason relied on firsthand experience and observed that the job descrip-
tion, one of the seven factors, did not support Avaya's allegations.
130
The court listed the four factors in which Avaya presented evidence to
the district court in line with EEOC regulations. The first factor is
"[Avaya] considers attendance at the administration center, supervision,
and teamwork as essential functions of the service coordinator position
.... While the court does not mention the form of this evidence, it
states that the job description does not mention this factor, and thus is not
based on an objective specification. The fourth factor, that "service co-
ordinators cannot be adequately trained or supervised if they are not at
the administration center, '132 like the first factor, is an allegation. These
are not objectively-based specifications; they are allegations made in
support of Avaya's argument, and the court finds them compelling. In
comparison, the court interprets Mason's evidence, which is based on
firsthand experience after two years on the job, as "self-serving."' 133 This
reasoning begs the question how Avaya's showing is not "self-serving,"
especially since it is made in an adversarial litigation setting. Further, it
answered Mason's argument that the job description did not support
Avaya's allegations with the comment that:
Avaya probably did not even consider informing its employees that
they were actually required to show up at the workplace and work
with co-employees under supervision when it drafted the service co-
ordinator job description .... Consequently, we find the omission of
physical attendance, teamwork, and supervision from the job descrip-
tion entirely unremarkable.
34
This backhanded dicta supports the argument that the Tenth Circuit will
grant deference to an employer who makes minimally substantiated alle-
gations while granting an employee with a valid and undisputed factual
point that directly applies to an EEOC factor, derision.
Additionally, the other factors Avaya brought forth are equally un-
compelling, even though they are listed by the EEOC as reasons why a
job function might be essential. 135 For example, factors two and three,
that all coordinators work at their service centers and Avaya has never
required them to work anywhere else, only reflect that Avaya has not
placed its coordinators in other work locations; it does not demonstrate
129. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004). See supro Section 111(C).
130. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1120.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 1121.
134. Id. at 1122.
135. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2004).
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that it could not reasonably accommodate the unique employee who, like
Mason, cannot physically work at the facility due to factors beyond her
control.
C. Future Directions
In comparison to the Avaya analysis and holding, the Ninth Circuit
took a vastly different approach in Humphrey that embraces the policy
behind the ADA. In Humphrey, Carolyn Humphrey was a medical tran-
scriptionist whose work performance exceeded her employer's "stan-
dards for speed, accuracy, and productivity."' 136 She developed an obses-
sive compulsive disorder, she began to arrive late to work or missing
work, 137 and as a result, she received warnings from her employer, Me-
morial Hospitals Association ("MHA"). 138 As a reasonable accommoda-
tion, Humphrey dismissed as infeasible having family or a friend drive
her to work, but she agreed to a flex-time arrangement. 39 After several
months, Humphrey recognized that the flex-time arrangement was not
working and asked to work from home as a reasonable accommoda-
tion. 14  MHA denied the request on grounds that employees who have
received job performance warnings are not eligible for at-home work.141
Even though Humphrey was given a stellar performance evaluation, she
was fired less than a month later due to the problems caused by her dis-
ability. 142 Humphrey differed from Avaya in one key aspect: the Ninth
Circuit's position that "attendance is not per se an essential function of
all jobs,' 143 and therefore "an employer must consider requested accom-
modation of working at home."' 44
Much like Avaya's argument that physical attendance is an essential
job function, MHA argued in Humphrey that she was not "qualified un-
der the ADA because regular and predictable attendance is an essential
function of the [transcriptionist] position." '145 Unlike Avaya, however,
MHA supported their argument with clear evidence that Humphrey's
unpredictability had a direct impact on her effectiveness in the workplace
because she could not attend training sessions scheduled during certain
days of the week. 146 Further, Humphrey concedes that "predictable job
136. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1130.
137. Id. at 1130-31.
138. Id. at It30.
139. Id. at 1131. There was dispute whether a third option was presented. MHA alleges it
offered Humphrey a leave of absence; Humphrey alleges MHA asked her if she would like to "con-
tinue working." Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that this factual point was not material to their analysis.
Id.
140. Id. at 1131-32.
141. Id. at 1132.
142. Id. Her supervisor stated that outside of the problems caused by her disability, she was a
model employee. Nevertheless, she received negative ratings due to these problems. Id.
143. Id. at 1135 n.11.
144. Id. at 1136-37 n.15 (citing Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060-61).
145. Id. at 1135.
146. Id.
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performance is an essential function of the MHA medical transcriptionist
position."'' 47 Despite these facts supporting MHA's case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit did not end its analysis. Instead, it stated that "attendance is not per
se an essential function of all jobs"'148 and proceeded to analyze the rea-
sonable accommodations Humphrey argued MHA could have made so
that she could perform the essential functions of her job. 
149
In comparison, the Avaya court stated that it was required under the
ADA to consider what the employer asserts are essential job functions.
Like MHA in Humphrey, Avaya argued that attendence was an essential
job function. Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Humphrey, however, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that this inquiry was "not intended to second guess the em-
ployer ..." and summarily ended its analysis on this disputed 
fact. 50
The effect was a rubber stamp on Avaya's allegations without any form
of objective analysis.
This approach does not necessarily support the Tenth Circuit's
statement in Avaya that is the facts that separates Humphrey from
Avaya;15 1 rather, it demonstrates that the two courts are vastly different in
how they approach their respective analyses. Where the Tenth Circuit in
Avaya states "[w]e will not second guess the employer's judgment,"' 5 2
and cites Vande Zande's holding that "an employer is not required to
allow disabled workers to work at home except in extraordinary circum-
stances,"'153 the Ninth Circuit in Humphrey shifts the focus of inquiry
because "an employer must consider requested accommodation of work-
ing at home"'154 and they "see no reason not to follow the approach taken
by the EEOC in its Enforcement Guidance."' 155 In other words, the Tenth
Circuit applies a very restrictive scrutiny toward an employee's claim
while the Ninth Circuit is far more permissive in its approach.
V. CONCLUSION
In Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held
that physical attendance in the workplace is an essential function of a
job, and that working from home is not a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA. The court relies on the statutes and valid case law for its
factual analysis and legal conclusion, and its holding corresponds with
those of most other circuits. However, this case demonstrates how a
147. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1135 n.11.
148. Id. See also, id. at 1136-37 n.15 (citing Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060-61).
149. Id. at 1135.
150. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119.
151. See supra note 110 (citingAvaya, 357 F.3dat 1124) (quoting Tyndall at 214).
152. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119.
153. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136-37 n.15 (paraphrasing the holding in Vande Zande, 44 F.3d
at 544-45). See Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1123 ("Many of our sister circuits have similarly held an em-
ployee's request for an at-home accommodation is unreasonable under the ADA.").
154. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136-37 n.15 (citing Langon, 959 F.2d at 1060-61).
155. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1136-37 n.15.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
person with a valid disability could be discriminated against in the work-
place because of their disability. The federal courts in the Tenth Circuit
would not likely invalidate the discrimination because the EEOC's regu-
lations favor the employer, and the courts place high deference to evi-
dence supplied by the employer regardless of whether the evidence is
objectively-based.
Additionally, while ADA cases require fact-specific calculus, the
notable difference in the approaches of the Avaya and Humphrey courts
demonstrates that it is not just facts that drive these cases. When the
Avaya court looked to case law in other circuits regarding whether work-
ing at home is a reasonable accommodation under ADA in the Tenth
Circuit, it had a choice to make: should it follow the restrictive approach
taken by the Seventh Circuit in Vande Zande,15 6 or should it apply the
more permissive Langon/Buckingham157 approach utilized by the Ninth
Circuit in Humphrey? It applied the Vande Zande holding, permitted
Avaya great deference, and effectively dismissed any chance of Mason
being considered qualified under the ADA despite that she had a valid
disability and absolutely no other option for a remedy.
The policy that drove the enactment of the ADA is sameness; it is
about "the promise of having the same opportunities on the same terms
and in the same settings as people without disabilities."'' 58 The Avaya
decision failed to achieve a result consistent with the spirit behind this
policy. Instead, Avaya strengthened the growing view in circuits that
physical presence in the workplace is an essential job function if the facts
minimally support this conclusion. If the courts can find a kernel of facts
supporting the Avaya holding, they can also find a kernel of facts sup-
porting the Humphrey holding. Had the Tenth Circuit ruled that working
from home could be a reasonable accommodation, it does not mean that
they had to rule in Mason's favor; rather, it would have resulted in a less
subjective analysis and it would have added flexibility in the law for fu-
ture cases.
What will it take to swing the courts over to a more flexible Hum-
phrey approach? As a starting point, the ADA must overcome wide-
spread skepticism associated with its application of preferential treat-
ment. 59 Critics of affirmative action complain that it is reverse discrimi-
nation that benefits a class at the expense of others.1 6° The same argu-
ment is levied against preferential treatment, a feature of both affirmative
action and reasonable accommodation. 6' Further, the argument that
reasonable accommodation levels "the playing field" between disabled
156. See supra note 153.
157. See supra notes 154-55.
158. Hubbard, supra note 7, at 1041.
159. See Ball, supra note 14, at 960.
160. Id. at 981.
161. See id. at 960.
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and nondisabled employees 62 can be argued in reverse by its critics, that
it advantages disabled employees over nondisabled employees.
These criticisms ultimately fail because they are based on the inac-
curate premise that reasonable accommodation benefits a class at the
expense of others. First, this is a circular argument because it presumes
that discrimination against the disabled has less of a societal impact or,
alternately, greater societal value, than requiring the employer to remove
these barriers. These are not facts; they are allegations that would be
hotly contested by ADA advocates. Second, reasonable accommodation
benefits individuals, not an entire class, which means that if there is an
ADA-related dispute, there is a fact-based analysis that must occur be-
fore the specific employee is entitled to receive a reasonable accommo-
dation by the employer.' 63 Additionally, if a reasonable accommodation
is made, it permits a disabled employee an equivalent working condition
to that of a nondisabled employee, but not an advantaged one.'64
The resolution to this dispute begins with a balanced analysis by the
judiciary. Not until the judiciary embraces the notion that the ADA ad-
vocates the ability of the disabled to work on an equal footing with their
non-disabled colleagues,1 65 rather than discriminatory "affirmative action
with a vengeance,"' 166 and the courts make rulings that support this pol-
icy, will the purpose behind the enactment of the ADA be realized.
The loser in this whole affair was appellant Mason who, due to a
truly unusual set of circumstances, developed a disability that led to the
loss of her job. The ADA sought in part to eliminate "unnecessary ex-
penditures resulting from the dependency and non-productivity of per-
sons with disabilities." 167 Hopefully, in the future, American business
will more pervasively embrace the advantages of having disabled em-
ployees work from home as a reasonable accommodation and thus em-
brace their important role in reducing the unnecessary expenditures asso-
ciated with the non-productivity of workers like Mason who could "per-
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 24, 61.
164. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 14, at 960-61. The author presents a case demonstrating how a
reasonable accommodation does not translate to unfair advantage of the disabled, Id. In the exam-
ple, a disabled professional golfer requested a reasonable accommodation in the form of a golf cart
because his degenerative circulatory condition forced him to endure severe pain when he walked.
Id.
165. Id. at 963. Preferential treatment given by an employer to one disabled employee may
have no relevance to another disabled employee because the nature of their disabilities may be
different. For example, accommodations for a blind employee may have no value to an employee in
a wheelchair. Thus, while the "disabled" are a class of individuals, treatments are not necessarily
"fungible" between members of the class. Id. at 975.
166. EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000) (Judge Posner
clarifies his position on the "principle" behind the ADA).
167. ADA PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, supra note 2, at 2.
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form all the essential functions of her job' 't68 provided that her employer
make a reasonable accommodation.
Patrick Rogers*
168. Avaya, 357 F.3d at 1119.
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to thank
Steven J. Rypma, Jennifer Grafton, Professor Rachel S. Amow-Richman, and Kellie Dougherty for
their insights in the development of this Comment.
